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Abstract
I

As institutions of higher learning become all the more dependJnt upon pub1ic financing throughout advanced industrial states, they are steadily being
pulled into their central political-legal systems. Deci.sions bearifng on the
form and.content of higher education have become the domain of state legislatures, the federal bureaucracy and, lately, of the superior c.ourts.• This paper.
attempts to provide a general explanation of how and why the judiciary 1 s ef- ·
forts to mediate disputes over controversial educational issues has 1 led it to
assume the role of policy-maker extraordinaire, with a special focus on developments in the German Federal Republic and the United States. The paper undertakes a summary comparison of six cases related to questions of unirersity
admissions, structures of university governance and. the selection of academic
personnel, pointing to the tensions which exist between the "consti~utional
rights 11 accorded to individuals, institutions and the state in matters educational. This work addresses the potential advantages and the inherent disadvantages
·that the 11 juridicalization 11 of educational politics hold. for the
11
separate-but equal" status of thajudicial branch itself. While the author
is more concerned with highlighting the extent to which the German t:ourts
have come to dominate the university reform process over the last ten years,
she is also anxious to demonstrate that e. ducati.onal pol icy-makers
this side
of the Atlantic are far from imrnmune to the perils of juridicalized politics.
1
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No amount of tampering with democratic theory_ can
conceal the fact that a system in which the policy
preferences of minorities prevail over majorities
is at odds with the traditional criteria for distinguishing a democracy from other political systems.
--Robert Dahl
Was bleibet aber, stiften die Richter.
--Wolfgang Perschel,
misquoting HBlderlin•

For at least a. decade, academic institutions have been under fire.

But .

unlike the phoenix, the principle of university autonomy,has not emerged unscathed from the ashes of what has been labeled a "revolution in the relationship of law and social policy._'.' 1 As institutions of higher learning become
a-11 the more dependent upon public financing throughout advanced industrial
.
.

.

states, they are steadily being pulled into their respective central political1ega l sys terns.

Decisions bearing on the form as we 11 as the on content of

higher education have become the domain of state legislatures, the federal
_bureaucracies and, lately, of the superior courts. The courts have tended to
play a particularly active role regarding matters educational in their efforts
to clarify -- or to obfuscate ""'.- the constitutional linkages between individual educational opportunities, institutional rights to self~determination and
compelling state interests, where_ other actors have purportedly failed.

In

fact, as Hans N. Weiler has noted,
it seems that, in both the American_ and the German
case, the courts have a capacity for making·legislative·i"nstitutions do things which they don't seem
to be able to do on their own political ·momentum. 2
Judicial elements have assumed ever greater responsibility for orchestrating the revolution in social policy, for the justices are now functioning
as law.:.makers in a dual sense. They are, in the first instance, obliged to
render judgments as tothe constitutional acceptability of specific legislative

2

actions in the field of higher education~

In so doing, they inad~ertently
I

provide ever more concrete guidelines for fu_ture legislation.

In the act of
1

1

,

•

-

•

•

.

-

I

becoming po 1i t,ca 1 partisans, however, the cour·ts have a1so been fbrced to
-

.

- ·-

-

I

surrender a measure of their own institutional autonomy out on thei battlefield.
This paper is an attempt to explore the expanding role of thel courts_ in 1

relation to higher educational policy, with a particular focus on prends in
the German Federal Republic and the United States.
of II creeping juridical i zati on 11 (al so 1abe 1ed

II

It begins with[a treatment

po 1i ti ci zed legal i sm 111 ) , a process

whereby policy-formulation and the statutory enactment of specific educational
re.forms come to be r~garded ag a type of "constitutional_ trench wa~fare. 113
-

-

.

.

.

I

I

attempt to provide a general explanation as to why and how the judicia.ry•·s ef-

to assume the
1

· forts to mediate disputes of a highly poiitical nature has led it

role of policy-maker extraordinaire, especially in the Federal Repjblic.

Next,

I undertake· a summary comparison of six cases handed down by the Gdrman Con~titutional Court (B~ndesverfassungsgericht = BVerfG) and the ·us SuprJme Court -

I

1

(USSC), respectively, impinging on the concept- of university autono my.

Th~se

cases are intended to illustrate the impact of judicial rulings on !procedures
for university aclmissions, the structures of university governance ~nd the selection of academic personn~1.

·Finally, I addre~s the potential ad~antages and

the inh~rent disadvantages that the spread of p~l i ti.cized 1ega 1 ism

j15

1 i kely

to entail for the formerly 11 separate but equal status 11 of the judic:ral branch_
itself.

While the paper is more directly concerned with the criticfl role

which the German. courts,have
'
- carved
- -,out for themselves
-_ in the- univetsityreI form process, _it also seeks to demonstrate that educational policy-iakers on
this si,de of the Atlantic are far from immune to the perils of politicized
•

.

.

I'

•

_ legalism.
A.

COMPLEXITY, THE COURTS AND EDUCATIONAL CHANGE.
With varying degrees of optimism, social theorists as diverse

I

Js Mannheim,
I

I
I

3

Gershenkron and Ellul have tended in the direction of a 11 convergence theory 11
which predicts the gradual progression of advanced industrial nations toward
a common social structure, a common array of social values, political struc-,
tures and technological developments. More recently, social scientists have
begun to speculate that modern polities might also be heading in the direction
of common educational patterns and shared models of educational change. 4 The
proposition is a sensible one, given our growing foabi1ity to divorce educational policy-making from the political process as a whole,and given our proclivity for borrowing back and forth information on institutional design and
educational research. 5
In a similar vein, the global character of uncertainties generated by the
energy crisis, mounting inflation and rising unemployment figures has led a
number of post-industrial bedfellows to share 11 an effective doubt about the
appropriateness of existing institutions and about the assumptions on which
they are predicated. 116 Checks and. balances don't seem to work as they used to,
with the result that the very boundaries of politics appear to have shifted.
Claus Offe; for instance, has observed a growing threat to the state's 11 monopoly of politics 11 in traditional areas, a development that is as much a function of specialization and expertise, as it is an outgrowth of more complex
relations among different segments of society. Add to that numerous citizens'
demands to be more actively involved in all decisions directly affecting their
lives.

What might be Judged to be an_increasing 11 loss of state" (Entstaatlichung)

in politics is nevertheless accompanied by an observable 11 politicization 11 of
other formerly autonomous or sacrosanct aspects of modern life, i.e. relations
between parents, childr.en and teachers, or between professors and their univers,·t·, es. 7
Uncertain as to what is really pol i ti ca 1 and what is not these days, and
no doubt somewhat frustrated that elected officials devote more time to rhetoric

I

4
I
I

than to problem-solving,
citizens are turning
with increasing freq~ency
to
.
. .
.
.
I.
that branch of go~ernment charged first and foremost with th~ prot~~tion of
.

-

.

I
I

individual (as opposed to group-political) rights.

Due to an increasing spe-

ial i.zation of gove;nment functions, Western nations have witnessed\ a transfer
·. of state power from the legislative to the executive branch; citizins begin to
.

-

.

.

.

-

.

I

sense that they have been deprived of direct access to policy-make s as a re-

1

sult. They may derive little comf~rt from the fact that relations\have been
.

.

.

.

I

.

.

far from harmonious between these two branches of government, in spite of an
os~ensibl e convergence of many political and admi nist~ative functid~s.

Legis-

1ators and administrators alike, each branch questions the authorily of the:
I

other to make and execute decisions in a variety of issue areas. \hey seek an
outside arbitrator.

I

.I

The one arm of state power whose authority has -~ east been subJ\ect to
question, whose members indeed continue to bask in an aura of relative infallibility, is the judicial branch.

On.e partial. explanation for the rn~rmous

respect still accorded the judiciary may rest. with the maxim:
bliss.

ignorance is
I

Until recently, citizens were not privy to information abouf how .the

justices made their decisions or were simply so overwhelmed by the Fomplex
. .

.. . .

.

•

. .

.

nature of the law, that they left it to the experts.
11

11

8

,

I

I

Beyond this rather

_· s.impl istic as.sessment, however, stands the belief that justices serle as the
-

.

-

-_

.

I

ultimate protector~ of legal procedure, the "watchdogs of due process" and
·.

I

.

equal protection. If for no other reason, this presumption.of final authority
.-·
. .
. .
.
-.
. . ..
I
permits judicial actors to lend a measure of legitimacy to almost
e~ery
social
.
.
I
.

'

policy they deign to approve.
.

f

Even when compelled to rule on questions of
•

.

.

I

I

political expediency, the courts' solutions are judged to be "less political"
:

a_nd. 11 more rational II than the compromises proffered by other gove~nmJnt offi-

cials.

-

. .

I

Interbranch rivalry has led to a further transfer of state authority

from the executive to the judiciary, just as interbranch rivalry will no doubt

5

discredit the 11 apolitical 0 • character of .iudicial pronouncements in the long run. 9
Politicized legalism (Verrechtlichung), as it is understood in Germany,
is the process whereby "the constitution is repeatedly invoked and its principles elaborated and interpreted in exhaustive detail. Such legalism channels
recurrent conflicts among political or ideological factions in many institutions.1110 .This ongoing invocation of constitutional principles has unleashed
the Furies of Politicization and Legalization against the institutions of
higher learning over the last ten years, especially in the Federal Republic.
The pie-eminent nature of concerns about the relationship between higher education and the law are perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the fiftyfirst "synod" of the German legal profession, the Juristentag, made the juridical ization issue a key item on its 1976 agenda. 11 The serious allegation that
the courts have taken certain liberties in establishing educational policy
guidelines rests not only upon a growing number of symposia and an expanding
body of literature on the topic, however. We have little difficulty in
accruing evidence of a more "scientific''. nature with regard to this phenonmenon
of "creeping" Verrechtlichung.

Knut Nevermann,.for instance,·has contributed

to the discussion of "evidence" by identifying four specific indicators of
juridicalization

in

the educational arena. They include:

a) the increase in the number of legal specifications
through administrative rules and regulations;
b) the increase in the number of court cases dealing
with either the admissibility of certain policies
or the legality of concrete decisions and developments in schools;
c) the increased role of parliamentary legislation as
a source of educational norms...
·
d) the growing use of legal arguments Lby individuals
as well as by institutions --,jmmJ . in the
political debate over educational policy.12
While developments in the higher educational field may present us with
a most striking case of juridicalization, it is also apparent to students of
the policy process that the courts have in no way limited their attention to

6
i

litigation of an academic nature.

No branch of law is immune, and no justice
.

is spared the fate of a growing workload.

I

FRG· statistics reveal ~hat the
I

number. of suits filed in the administrative COurts grew from 48,2,7 in 1970

to 172,921 in 1978. Trials for those accused· of various "public dlisturbances 11
1

(Ordnungswidrigkeiten, including demonstration arrests) rose from 214,707 in
1

•

.

I

1971 to 658,463 in 1978. The finance courts saw their caseload~ increase from
I
13
13,525 suites in 1970 to 44,357 ·in 1978.
The number of case ent~ies per
.

.

.

. .

.

.

.

I
I

·r

.

...

justice brought before the Bundesverfassungsgeri cht _rose from· 154 in .1976 to
to 194.4 in 1978. 14 Judges in the US have not.fared all.that much betteri The
.

.

.

.

number of cases filed with the US Supreme Court totaled 4,212 in 1Q70 and 4,731
in 1978. 15 The Circuit Courts of Appeals disposed of 6,139 cases I (out of a
total of 11,662 filed) in 1970 and 8,850 (out-of 18.918) in 1978.f 6 The Dis'

trict Courts commenced with 87;,300 civil. cases in_ 1970 and 138,800 Iin 1978,
while criminal cases on the docket numbered 38,100 in 1970 and 46,t00 in 1978. 17
.

I

Given the phenomenal workloads facing ·the justices in traditional litiga.

.

r

tional arenas·, what could possibly compel the courts to devote ~o much more
.

I

I

attention to questions of educational policy and academic affairs, jheretofore
-

-

.

.

I

the province of pedagogical experts and school boards only? It wotild appear
that in both the US and the FRG, one's constitutional right to hig~er education

I

is largely a derivative one, and that the creatior1 of specific leg,1 norms for
academe is equivalent to "legislating in the interstices of the la~," in the
words of Christopher Wolfe. 18 Wolfe goes so far as to argue th.at ~he Consti-

I

· tution has been taken out of Co11~Law, insofar as :the new ·contents w\ith which
legal vacuums and loopholes have b~en filled~ h~ve given ~ise to a ~judicial
.

necessary and proper clause."

I

Guaranteed access to education, along with the
I

.

I

protection of academic freedom, are viewed by members of the bench
.

· bral to
.

a catalogue of constitutional
..

as
I

penum-

rights that have _turned into ~ndividual

.

1iberti es: 19 free development of the per~onal ity

I

(§ 2GG);

equality '.rn 3GG) and
I
'

"'

7

the free choice of profession (~ 12/lGG); fostered by the "social state"

(i20GG); freedom of speech and association (Amd. I, USC), due.process and
equal protection (Amd. XIV, USC). 20 But there are also.broader justifications
being offered for·judicial involvement in academic matters, some of which go
so far as to stress the state's "compelling interest" in a diversified stu~
dent body, in .compensating .for past patterns of- discrimination and in ensuring a
highly trained, scientifically skilled labor force vital to the nation's economic health and. military security. 21 Educational ch~nge, in short, is a key·
to.social change; and educational policy, in the long run, can not be divorced
from other socia1 policy problems. 22
Clearly, the courts cannot be expected to find all of the answers.

How-

ever, before addressing the manner in which German constitutional justices and
their American .counterparts came to, saw and conquered many of .the otherwise
irresolvable political conflicts facing educational authorities, we need to
attend briefly to the question:

under what circumstances, or conditions is the

juridical solution likely to 11 stick? 11
The judicial remedy is most effective when no other solution seems to
exist! This is to say that any solution the court proposes is more lik~ly to
be accepted and applied to a pressing social problem if the tribunal of justices
need not defer to acts of parliamentary discretion, on the one hand, or where
it is not subject to the prior constraints of its own decisions in some, oth_er
, rel~ted case. 23 ,The Bu~desverfassungsgericht's 1972 Numerus clausus opinion
discussed infra serves as one example; for want of an institutionalized set
of university admissions and selection criteria, the justices had little trouble pers_uading the Lander ministries to accept standards based on individual
merit, waiting time and "hardship" status. 24 In this instance, one can reasonably argue that the judiciary does not in.terpret, it in effect makes the
law.

8

.

.

.

I

This tendency to create law (RechtsschBpfung) where none fonnfrly exists
is more pronounced in the Federal Republic than in the US, for thelmain reason
..

.

I

that the BVerfG justices are not ·at liberty to dispose of political questions
'

by·simply refusing to consider them.

'

!

But even in such .cases wherelthe thrust

of the court·opinion has been an exhortation to legislators-to
invent
their·
.
I
I

own solutions, ·the judiciary has met with little· success in decisively extrieating itself from the political process.

.

1

.

I

In short, more legislation means

more litigation, as disgruntled interest groups look to members of the bench
· in Karlsruhe for a more favorable interpretation of the law _.;. or to the breth[

ren in Washington, D.C., for that matter.·

I

A judicial remedy will prove mtich less effective-when the courft as a body
I

finds itself politically or philosophically out of step with the· current law.

I ·_

making majority.

Given what we know about the socialization of judges, we may
.
.
.
.I
presume that they are not habitually radical reformers, relatively jspeaking. 25

Hence, the bench is less inclined to act'-- to·haveits

11

ultimate 11 !authority
·,!

questioned or jeopardized, as it were -- when it is unable to set the bounds
1.

for officials and state governm·ents; where it needs to defer to agency or par1

I

liamentary discretion (Gesetzesvorbehalt); if it is unable to resol:ve an issue
I

by a preventitive injunction; or where "it cannot render a dec·ision \that is
.
I
otherwise easilymonitored. 26 ·The court will not openly challenge bolitical
.

I

elements when its own autonomy might appear to swing in the balance!.

In ref-

1

ere nee to the US Supreme Court, Robert Dah 1 has _detenni ned,

I

·I
I

• except for short-1 ived transitional periods when thel old
alliance is disintegrating and the new one is struggHng
to take control of political -institutions, the Supreme
Court is inevita_bly a part of the dominant alliance.j As
a·n .element on the political· leadership of the dominant .
alliance, the Court of course supports the major pol~cies
of the alliance. By itself, the Court is almost owerless
~to affect the course of national policy (my emp as1s1. 27
The same can be said of the German Constitutional Court:

Juridical zation is a

,;covert" political activity, through .which the Court must necessari y seek to
.

9

enhance its own political status within .the leadership coalition.
Perhaps the 1970's witnessed an end to such a period of disintegrating
alliances, a thesis which would help us to explain why indeed the courts have
been very powerful with respect to influencing policy in the educational sector.

During the period under investigation, the justices in Karlsruhe had

neither been appointed by, nor were they exactly partial to members of the new
SPD government which assumed office at the end of the 1960 1 s.

Nor does one

find evidence of much political affinity between the members.of Warren court
and the ,Nixon administration.

In both instances, the philosophical orienta-

tion and composition of the two courts predated the new governments by at least
a decade, a factor which (common sense tells us) must have enhanced the legiti· macy of the courts' pronouncements.

By the late 1970's the equilibrium be-

tween the executive and the judiciary was reestablished, one can conceivably
argue, given the SPD's rejection of its own more radical reform goals in the
FRG and a number of revisions undertaken by the Burger Court as part of a
larger political consensus in the us. 28 But even though the balance l)'laY have
·since been restored at the leadE!rship level, one continues to observe in the
aftermath that 11 ordinary 11 citizens turn with increasing frequency to the courts
on a variety of important issues, in the United States as well as .in the Federal Republic.

My grounds for generalizing about the process of juridicali-

zation in two societies characterized by very different legal traditions rest
with a number of striking parallels that can be drawn between the Numerus
clausus and Bakke cases, between the Group University and.Yeshiva decisions,
and to a lesser extent, between the Radical Ordinance and the Keyishian cases,
explored below (official citations i!l:f!:.~.). 29
·B.

INDIVIDUAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND STATE RIGHTS:. PREVAILING LEGAL TRADITIONS
Before discussing case specifics, I think a brief comparison of the German

and American legal traditions is in order. · Historically, the German system of

'

I

i
I
I

i
jurisprudence has been more concerned with adhering to the letter of
the Basic
I

Law, -than with 'expounding upon its spirit.

The judiciary's role hJs been an
I

inherently conservative one; it defines its main function as that df testing
I

.

I

current, legislatively mandated practices against the dictates of the provi.

.

.

I
I

sional constitution.

In recent years, however, the Justices have s et out on
!
a course of greater activism, spurred on, - ironically, by that other strong30
hold of German conservatism, the.CDU/CSu.
Prior to the 1972 Nume:rus clausus
1

.

..

.

.

decision, the
.

.

11

.

.

-

.

I

.

i

guardians 11- of Karlsruhe lion the whole declined the i\nvitation
.

.

.

i

to define the content of open or opaque constitutional clauses1 further than
·. ·· LwaiJnecessary to rule out the clearly
un<:onstitutional. 1131
i
.
I
.

. .

I

I

The Court's efforts to preserve ambiguity and, with that,: flex~bility. have
.

I

nonetheless been limited by four features peculiar to·the German lehal system,,
•

.

the· so-called Rechtsstaat.

•

I,

1). The BVerfG,: unlike the ·American! Suprbme
Court,
I

•

.

has· no doctrine of "political. questions" -at its disposal.

As

I

a resµlt,

I

I

.

it is

I

required to pass judgment .on any i-ssue that is construed to fa] 1 wifhin close
range of a coristitutiona·1 norm.

In the absence of parliamentary se1f-restraint,
-

I

•

I

or in view of a parliamentary failure to act, the Court is virtually compelled
I

to enter the:political arena.

It is nonetheles~
a highly specializ~d
court
.
I
•

I

of constitutional affairs; administrative regulations, social security claims,
.

.

.

1

.

labor disputes, questions of civil and criminal justice or ffoanceiare re•

vi ewe<i by other equally speci a 1i zed court branches.

-

'1

.

2) Elected by the two -

.

I

.

houses of Parliament for non-renewable twelve year terms, ·the membe~s of the
I

court are divided into two chambers~ call ed. Senates.

In contr~st td the ad".'

· ·cversary rule which governs case selection in the US, the Bundesverfdssungsi

gericht bears responsibility for cases involving both individual

.

11

cdnstitu-

I

tional complaints" (the domain of the First Senate) and those ~nvol~ing the
. comprehensive

11

i

control of abstract legal norms 11 (delegated to the S~cond Senate).
'

i

:

I .

The clo_sest_ American equivalen_ t to "abstract control 11 is the principle of
I

-

l

11

ju~icia1 review.

In norm-control proceedings, however, initiators are not

re4uired to have a direct, material, practical or substantial interest in the
I
I

ca~e before them.

In short, it is much easier for a political party, wearing

thT cloak of a Bundestag caucus or (more frequently) a Land government of a
I

particular ideological complexion to turn a controversial political issue into
a subject for judicial review.

3) Rather than extolling the virtues of l'prec-

:

ed~nt, 11 the training of Gennan jurists emphasizes the precepts ,of Roman Law,
viz. reliance on the deductability of the llone right answer" from a wellel~borated system of legal norms.

In fact, the dissenting opinion did not be-

coke part of the Court's legal.• apparatus until 1970, and the immediate 'result
!

wa~ that the justices found it impossible to close the lid, once they opened
th is Pandora's box to the political opponents of various rulings. 32 4) Finally,
1

i

.

i~ light of the atrocities of the Nazi regime, the Constitutional Court is
particularly sensitive to all questions pertaining to the German "Bill of Ri,ghts. 11

The Basic Law is responsible for the special tension which has devel-

oped
between the guarantee of individual liberties, on the one hand, and the
;
'

· otiligation of the

11

social state" to provide for the common good, on the other.

I

Ir, fact, individual constitutional _grievances are reported to account for about
96 percent of all cases submitted and for 55 percent of all published opinions.
T~e notion of

11

t? ensure both.

equal protection" -requires the state to take affirmative measures
As to this last point, the Court has realized that the costs

of its orders to the state are likely to become prohibitive, as proved to be
the case with the 1972 Numerus clausus decision.

Yet the._Court can do no

I

other.

33

34

The combined effect of the first three features .is· a high degree of
irreversibility in the establishment of legal norms.

The Constitutional Court

o~erates along the lines of 11 what I have written, I have written. 11

On the

o:ther hand, it is i,mpossible to assess the extent to which. this tendency also

12
I

tempers i.ts decisions. The meliorating or aggravating circumstanqes produced
I
I

-by the interjection of the fourth factor renders a decision more difficult,
.

-

I

i

but does nothing to alleviate the Jnflexibility aspect of the judghlent process
generally. 35
i
The US Supreme Court has moved "from the byways onto the highways of
.

.

1.

I

policymaking" under a different set of litigatidnal conditions.
-

.

B~iefly, 1)

.

I

adjudication is focused; rather than mulling over possible alternatives in
I

11

search of the

one best way,

11

11

justices consider which · remedies

11

I

ca:n

be appro-

!

priately applied to redress specific "wrongs"- done to identifiable I individuals
i

who possess
precedents

11

rights. 11 2) American adjudication is piecemeal in nature; while
.

may

I
I

be established, a courtroom victory often centers o~ statutory
.

details or circumstantial factors.

I

3) In contrast to the practive of ab_stract

norm control, Supreme Court judges must wait for litigants to;call

They can

not initiate adjudicative action, which consequently "makes ttle seJuence of
I

judicially ordered change dependent upon the capricious. timing ofJ i ti gants ,-"
I

rather than upon strategic planning by state agencies or Congr,essi9nal caucuses.36

4) The unrepresentative character of the litigants who cdme calling
..

I
I

•

in Washington means that the judicial process does not provide established

I

I

mechanisms for policy review, nor can the USSC justices adju.re members of Con.

-

,

I

· gress to take legislative action as forcefully as the BVerfG judgesr do under
the principle of "statutory reserve 11 (Gesetzesvorbehal t). 37 A finajl differ1

1

ence between decisions rendered by the bench in Karlsruhe and :washi ngton lies
I
1

. in their overall legal-philosophical
approaches
to constitutio:nal r Iights.
•
.
1

Whereas the German Court pushes a substantive-constitutional approa~h, equipped
I

as it is to render principles in the abstract and to delegate autho'rity for
I.

entire policy a_reas to specific organs of government·; the Supreme C9urt pre'

sumes a -degree of special "procedural insight, 11 couching its argume~ts in terms
I

of due proce·ss and equal protection, th_at is, across:..the-board application of
•

!
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whatever rules are at hand.

In the latter, the problem is to find the right
rule rather than to establish the right social alternative. 38
The 11 university crisis" of the late sixties neither recognized the existence of national political boundaries, nor respected the _limits of particular
academic disciplines. Their 1itigationa1 and philosophical differences not-

withstanding, superior courts in th~ FRG and the US were forced to the center
of the political stage to mediate conflicts produced
both.

by

problems common to

In a manner illustrative of convergence-theory-i:1.t-work, universities in

both national settings fell prey to the pressures of:

a)

the rapid expansion

of the student body, followed by dramatic increases am1:mg the ranks of the
academic teaching staff;,

b)

the "knowledge explosion, 11 resulting from tech-

nological specialization and the exponential growth of science in society at
1arge;

c) an emphasis on ega 1i tari ani sm ,and the push for extended educa tiona 1

opportunities; d) quantitative as well as qualitative changes in labor market
demand;

e) rising institutional and research costs and constraints imposed by

finite fiscal resources; and f) conflicts generated by the politicization of
academe. 39 I now turn to six cases which attest to the commonality of these
pressures, in order to examine similarities and differences among the juridical outcomes produced by contrasting legal traditions.
C. ADMISSIONS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY:

Numerus clatisui and Bakke*

Article 12/1 of the Basic Law guarantees all Germans the right to choose
freely their vocations, educational facilities and places of work, as do respective articles in the L:inder constitutions. German institutions of .higher
learning found it impossible to meet the constitutiona11ly-based demand, when
.

'

the Federal Education Ministry's enrollment projections of 280,000 for 1978 ·
and 560,000 for 1980 were ·surpassed in 1960 (291,000) and 1971 (587,000),

*

.

.

Cases are listed under Bundesverfassungsgericht; 1 BvL 32/70, 1 BvL 25/71,
Urteil vqm 18. Juli 1972 and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
98 S. Ct 2733 (1978).
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respectively.

40

i
I

University rectors; in conjunction with LM.nder educational ministers,
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

!

devised a system for imposing numerical limitations on admissions.

In 1972,

I
I

·.~dministrativ; courts in Ha~bu~g and Mu~fch lodged an ap~eal o~ beh~lf of sev1

In a··landmark decisiory of July 18,

eral medical school applicants denied entry.

the Bundesverfassungsgeri cht found that the Numerus cl ausus syhem, Idevised
to meliorate tlie overcrowding
of especially
popular dis~ipline~,
i.J.
the
,
.
'
I
medical- sciences, violated the precepts of Article 12/lGG. 41 Its aJplication

-

·-

.

.

.

,

.I

was permissible if and only if the university in question could prove that its
,

.

-

,

I
I

departmental capacities were in fact completely exhau-sted, and until such time
as_ 1eg is 1a tors s ucc~eded 1n es tab 1is hi ng specif i c, no.ndi sCri in; ~a tor~ admissions
criteria or, alternatively, introduced a 11 lottery 11 system. The justices upheld
'
'
j
11
11
the use of academic achievement (Abitur scores and Gymnasium grade point av.

I

erages) as the primary detenninant, "waiting time" and
'I.

.

.

-·

.

· secondary criteria.

.

-

11

hardship sta'.tusll as

,

I -

..

!

The Constitutional Court., in ess·ence, challenged federal
'

-

''

'

:

''

i

· law-makers to develop "objective and universally _applicable norms 11 1or admissions decisions, a prerogative th'at had been exercised so.lely by th~ university
.

in former times.

.

-

.

,

,

I

As literally thousands of individuals continued td file
I

I

I

'

,

I

claims against specific institutions, the superior administrative c9urts deemed
it their role in subsequent decis.ions on "university capacitief to !expedite the

flow of students by actually subjecting
to systematic, external. controls
the
.
I
content of courses and the ·scope of acc1.demi c programs. 42 The Numeru:s cl ausus
. system remained -in force.·

i

1·
I

In 1973 and again .in 1974, a white male named Allari Bakke was denied entry
1

to the Medical School of the University of California at Davis, in s~pite of
the fact that his grade .point ave'f'.'age, MCAT and "bench mark"- sc.ores. ere sig-

1

nificantly higher than a number of other individuals admitted to thej program.
,

I
• I

,

.In·q case that reached the Supreme Court in 1977~ Bakke charged the Davis
-

'

'·

I

I

•
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Medical School with violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff
argued that Davis' special selection program reserving a set number of admissions sJots for minority applicants constituted reverse descrimination on the
basis of race.

In a decision characterized as "a remarkable act of judicial

statecraft," the Supreme Court struck down the speci~ic admissions formula
used at Davis, thus ordering Bakke's entry into the p,rogram,· while simultaneously
''

affirming the principle of special procedures for minorities to counterbalance
the effects of past discrimination.

Brennan's opinio~ for the majority re-

sorted to standards of "intermediate scrutiny," while ' dissenting. Justice
I

Powen was the only one to adhere unfailingly to "equal protection" arguments.
The overarching verdict nonetheless advanced the.noti~n that 11 the right tci procedural due process 11 has intrinsic as well as instrumental constitutional
value, and that.its value in this instance was absolute. 43
11

The main difference between the Numerus clausus ~nd the Bakke rulings can
'

.

be summarized thus:

the German Constitutional Court has sought to put pressure

on as_ many parties as possible -- legislators, educat,ional administrative agencies and individual institutions of higher learning -;- to ensure that university places are made available to as many potential registrants as necessary.:i
as soon as possible, in light of a clear-cut constitutional mandate.

The US

Supreme Court has applied pres-sure primarily to the i;nstitution fo question
I

to devise procedures ( for a1locating whatever places :exist) that ensure equal
consi~~ration and protection to.individuals in their'.competition for those
limited open slots.

~

search for parallels between the two cases r·eveals that

in accepting 11 waiting time" and 11 hardship 11 criteria,lthe German judiciary recognize~ the need to compensate for pas~ pattern~ of ~iscrimination, as does the
American Court's attention to female and minority qualifications.

In both

cases, the justices realize there is a need for a societal commitment to the

16
I
I
I

I

principle of "equal opportunity," and they speak further of'the st~te's interII

-

ests, as ranging fr6m special to substantial to compelling~ in thelinstitutions'
ability to apply fair standards. 44 - In neither case do the justiceJ go so far
.

I

.

I

as to oblige the state to provide unlimited opportunities to individual appl ic~nts; but.while both courts begin their deliberations by focusing! on equal
1

opportunity,· the German case ends with admissions stipulations thai± are more or
I

less meritocratic in nature, while the American ruling ends with requirements
II

- of the procedura'r sort.

.

Both cases have had the effect of "throwing the universities to the
!

.

.

-

.

wolves;" they are damned if they do, damned if they don't.

I

The judges admit
I
I

-

1

that "the freedom of a university to ma:ke its own judgments as to education
.

includ~sthe selection of-its student body~-

1145

I

Universities are nerertheless

obliged to appear before the courts time and time again to defend their pro1

cedures for estimating the numbers, as well as the mechanisms for diistributing
•

•

-

II

the slots.-· The most striking-aspect of the juridicalized treatment[ of admis•

•.

•

•

j

sions questions is that it has lent itself to an institutionalization of do's
.

.

'

I

.

.

.

i

and don't's (e.g. the USSC's support for the "Harvard· model, the BVerfG's -·
I

three· selection criteria) for what were expected tobe temporary, e~ergency
I
I

!

procedures.·

D.. UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE:. The Group University and the Yeshiva . Decisions **
Unable to implement directly their own strategy for higher edubational
.

.

.

I
I

•.

.

reform in the German Bundestag after 1969, conservative CDU/CSU elements
!
: joined forces outside parliament; their ,purpose was to block the_ "dtmocratici.zation" of :the university foreseen by the SPD's 1971 draft Fed_er11 Frame.

I

work Law for Higher Education (Hochschulrahmenoesetz).

-

** ·. .

-

.

.

-

-

-

.. .

The SPD hoped to

- -. I
.-

I

Cases are offici~lly listed as B~ndesverfassun~sgericht, 1 BvR 424A71,
1 BvR 325/72, .verkundet am 29. Mai 1973 and National Labor Relations Board v.
· Yeshiva Univers,ty, 100 S.Ct. 856 (1980).
·
!
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build on a parity model introduced earlier in Berlin, which provided for an-.
equal number of faculty, student and non.,;academic staff representatives in
university decision-making organs. On May 29, 1973, the Constitutional Court
handed down a verdict-in favor of 398 professors and associates, who opposed
the inclusion of the parity model in the Higher Educational "Preliminary Law 11
(Vorschaltsgesetz) in Lower Saxony. The Karlsruhe majority ruled that threeway parity in university decision-making organs violated the constitutional
rights of the senior academic staff members, as posited by Art. 5/3GG (cited

.inf.!:!). Moreover, the court held that these full professors were to be guaranteed at least one half of the seats (inassgebender Einfluss) in any body regulating teaching and examinations, and assured a clear majority (50 percent
plus one, ausschlaggebender Einfluss) in matters of academic hiring, firing
and research.

(The decision took no note of the fact that tenured full pro-

fessors in most institutions were outnumbered at least two or three to one by
associate and assistant level faculty charged with primary academic functions).
In the final analysis, the Constitutional Court recognized in principle the
need for the representation of all groups directly affected by academic de . .
cisions in central university organs9 at the same time it limited proportionately the amount of influence that each of these groups could brfog to bear on
final decisions, according to the participants' level of "qualification."
These proportional limitations were subsequently incorporated into the 1976
Federal Framework Law.
Judicial influence on university governance structures in the US does not
find expression in a particular educational statute. According to the pro-visions of the National Labor Relations Act, however, supervisors and mana'."
gerial personnel are to be excluded from the categories of emp1oyees entitled
to the benefits of collective bargaining.

In 1974, the Yeshiva University

Faculty Association petitioned the NLRB for certification as the union

18
bargaining agent for full time faculty at 10 of· Yeshiva '.s 13 graduate and
II

undergraduate schools.

The university's central administration opposed this
I

action on the grounds that faculty members exercised supervisory ard manage•

I,

rial authority, and hence did not fall within the categories eligiple for
46 The NLRB ~ranted the petition,!and cerbargaining status under the Act.
I'

tified .the faculty union after its successful election •. The university .re~
I
I

.

fused to bargain with this unit .and the board refused to reconsider the "ex•

-

.

,

I

;

•

I

slusion 11 issue.

On February .20, 1980, the Supreme Court affirmed ~n Appeals

Court decision holding that faculty were "in effect, substantially i and per1

vasively operating
the·. enterprise"
and they
enjoyed a "managerial hatusll
•
I
sufficient to disqualify them from-the coverage of the Act. 47 .. Le}t unre.

!

solved was question of. their ".supervisory status;" while latter ty~e implies
.

.

..

I

that academic professionals use independent judgment, overseeing a1 institution
in the interest .of the employer, the.former status designation indlcates a
more general, cooperative involvement of faculty in

11

developing,an4 enforc-

ing employer policy. 1148 The dispute appears
to have been narrowlyldefined
in
.
\
.

.

i

terms of the particular degree of "alignment with management" obse~ved to exist
between the Yeshiva Faculty and the Central Administration.
I

In concentrating on the 11 managerial -status"aspect, - the Supretrie Court·
'

!

carefully skirted· the issue of statutory interpretation, viz. the rieed to
!

adapt the National Labor Relation:Act's broad provisions to differ~nt types of
•

'

workplaces.

I

This _act of judicial restraint, in conjunction wi.th Yeshiva's
I .

standing as a private university., produced no clearcut-rule with r~spect to
professional academics and collective bargaining rights.

While Yeslhiva findI

i ngs are expected· to lend themse 1ves to a -case by case review, the effect of
1

- the Group·Univers'ity decision was immediate and universal.
The Group University case focuses on a constitutional _grievanc e involving
1

full professors' rights to self-determination vis

a vis

I

other insti tutional
1

i
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groups in matters of teaching and research; the Yeshiva suit was technically
appellate in nature, entailing no specific constitutional complaint (_although
the latter might be construed to cover the freedom of ·association). On the
surface, the two cases demonstrate no significant overlaps with respect to
substance:

In fact,

a debate

over the collective bargaining rights of German

professors is unlikely ever to arise, since :they are legally designated public
servants, whose employment and salary terms are regulated by Federal and State
Civil Service Codes. But the two' rulings do raise similar questions of principle.

In both instances, there is a recognition that ·facult~ responsibilities

and functions are distinct from trose of other segments of the university com'

.

munity, a distinction which rests with the level of professional qualification.
1

Both courts have implicitly recognized the institution's right to :provide for,
indeed to require, faculty involvement in university governance, insofar as
"professional expertise is indispensable to the formulation and implementation
of academic policy. 1149
A critical question addressed in both cases

is whether the faculty's right

to participate is equivalent to· the faculty s right to decide. The German and
1

'

American Courts approached this question from very dirferent angles, as did
the respective litigants. To protect themselves from challenges "from below," the German professors filing suit iri 1973 tried to claim for themselves
the same measure of discretion and absolute authority over academic decisions,
j

that the Yeshiva faculty argued they did not have, in order to ensure bargaining power vis

a vis

administrators 11 from above." The Supreme Court begins with

the assumption that faculty "authority in academic matters is absolute; 115 0 the
'
Constitutional Court concludes with
the idea that the faculty must have final

say in certain areas,· but its power is 11 substantial

11

a~d c6ntrolling, 11.not
11

absolute. The German judiciary finds a "middle solution/' to which it attaches
a numerical formula that becomes: legally binding on all institutions of higher

20

learning. · For the present, the American judiciary holds a more "extreme" posi1

tion· wMch ·lends itself to application in institutions whose circumstances
.

II

will have to resemble· closely those·at Yeshiva.

·1

I

ACADEMIC FREEDOM:

E.

The Radical Ordlnance and the Keyishian Rulilngs ***
'!

The German experience underHitler led the authors of .the Basile Law to;
incorporate academic freedom into the catalogue of fundamental rigHts in 1949.
I

Article 5/3GG asserts,

I
I

Art and Science, research and teaching shall be
free. Freedom of teaching shall not absolve from
loyalty to the Constitution.
·

i

I
I

Neverthe 1ess, on February 18, 1972, Chance 11 or Wi 11 i Brandt joined [the heads
of ·the L~nder governments in formulating guidelines to regulate thel public em.

.

I

ployment of right and left wing radicals (Extremistenbeschluss). This "Radical
.
..
. I.
.
11
Ordi.nance was intended to subject civil service candidates of ques tionable po1

1

. litical backgro~nd to "constitutional loyalti' ~hecks, p~ior to gra~ting them
tenure.

Academics were included in li.ght of. their civil service cl~ssification.
i

Instead of checking personal political histories only in those case~ where
i
11

11

evidence was already known to ~xist, the exception quickly became! the rule.
·.

.

.

.

.

.

'

!

.

.

.After 1973, Land-1 evel "constitutional protection offices, 11 tied to a monolithic,
computerized appar~tus at the national level, .carried out .routine ihvestigations
.
.
.
I
51
on persons applying for public service jobs, as well as on those up!for tenure.
.

. .

.

.

.

.

.

I

On May 22, 1975, the justices in Karlsruhe announced that even; those work.

.

. .

I

.

.

ing for the state on a temporary or .trial basis had to submit to a test
of
I
•

~

-

their loyalty (including legal a.nd medical interns).
.

.

.

I

The BVerfG decreed:

•

I

•

The political· loyalty obligation requires more than just
a formally correct,· but otherwise disinterested, cool,
internally-distant posture toward the state and the I
---

***These

··1

·'•
!

cases are officially cited as Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 ~vL 13/73,
vom 22. Mai 1975. and Ke ishian v. Board of Reents of the Universit of the
State of New York, 385 U.S. 589 1967.
I
I

)

21

Constitution; it demands of the civil servant in
particular that he clearly distance himself from
groups and endeavors which attack, oppose and
defame this state, its constitutionally created
organs and the valid constitutional order. (my
emphasis). 52
With this particular verdict, the Constitutional Court has gone far to forge
new ties between the exercise of one's duties and prerogatives within the academic community and the exercise of professional 11 voice 11 and choice.of career
outside the university.

Instead of reading into· Art. 5/3 a set of double

safeguards for the individual with respect to academic freedom and free ,political expression, the court has reinterpreted Art. 5/3 in favor of the state's
"compelling interest 11 in its own survival and good name. This variation on
the "guarantee" theme means that the proverbially neutral civil servant is to
be replaced with a prospective public servant who not only evinces a willingness to support the principles of the Constitution; s/he must demonstrate
further an ability "to defend actively" and unquestionably the state itself
against its real and potential enemies.

In fact, individuals have been barred

from public service {Berufsverbot) not because of "unconstitutional" .behavior
(verfassungswidrig), but on the grounds that their political statements and
affiliations have been "inimical to the constitution" (verfassungsfeindl ich),
an argument which in many cases has stood in violation of Art. 21/2 (free choice
of political parties) and Art. 33 (free and equal access to civil service employment). The judiciary has provided no concrete standard for distinguishing
between academic discourse on alternative political ideologies, personally cool
and distant expressions regarding the existing German state., or an active call
to political insurrection.
Free speech and academic freedom were dominant constitutional concerns in
the American case of an English instructor, Keyishian, and three of his colleagues; the fpur refused to sign a certificate
declaring they were non-com.
.

munists when their original employer, the privately owned University of Buffalo

22
merged in 1962 with the State University of New York system.

The $UNY Board
I

of Regents sought to draw up a··list of llsubversi-ve organizations for the ex11

.

'

pr~ssed purpose· of using membership in such organizations as prima 1facie evi1

'

dence for disqualifying or dismissing individuals. from service in the state's
'1

public schools.

Disqualification would ensue on the basis of membership inII

.

-

.

quiries addressed by the appointing authority to an applicant's fotjmer emplayers or associates, according to a 1939 law.

-

.

I

Keyishian 1 s one-year-term
I,

contract was not renewed on the bas.is of his refusal to sign the cJmmunist

I

disavowal certificate.

i,

The Supreme Court did not question the Board 1 s legttimate interest in
I

.

protecting the educational system from subversion, but it reject~d \the dis-·_
qualification mechanisms which it warned were 11 susceptible of sweeJ-ing and
1
11
improper ·application," si~ce they lacked terms susceptible of obje[ctive
measurement. i, 53 The Court declared portions of New ·York 1 s Educatio n Law and
.

I
1

its Civil Se~vice Law unconstitutional, b·ut did. not limit itself to\ a ~ejec- ·
'

I

tion of inappropriately vague statutory provisions.
.

-

The judiciary ~ent a step
.

.

- .I .

further _in linking safeguards of academic freedom to a defense of the larger.
.
.
.
. I
socfo-political 11 market place of ideas. 1154 Moreover, the justice~·~ppeared
-.
I.
sensitive to an individual's and their own inability to draw fine irnes be.

tween academic discourse and subversive expression:

I

!

The teacher cannot know the extent-, if any; to which\
a "seditious" utterance must transcend mere statement
about abstract doctrine, the extent to which it niust f
.be intended.to and tend to indoctrinate or incite t6
[·
action in furtherance of the defined doctrine~ 55
• I

.

In an earlier related decision, Wieman v. Updegraff (involving a lo~alty oath
at the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College in 1952), the cdurt had
similarl.y held that "membership" alone could not disqualify from putjlic educatfonal appointment .. Tne ."free speech 11 dimension of academic appoi[ntment
was substantiated further when Justice Frankfurter, concurring in th e -1957
1
1

I
I,
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decision of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, refused to stand the individual's guarantee of political expression on its head:
For society's good - if understanding be an essential
need of society - inquiries into these problems, speculations about them, stimulation in others of reflection upon them, must be left as unfettered as possible.
Political power must abstain from intrusion into this
activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of wise
government and the people's well-being, except for
reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling. 56
Herein lies the critical differences between the German and. American judicial responses to the concept of academic freedom.

Whereas the freedom of

teaching and research is explicitly designated as an individual right in the
Basic Law (listed fifth in the 11 Bill of Rights" section), academic freedom,
in fact, takes a back seat to the state's presumedly "compelling interest" in
an actively loyal corps of civil servants.· While the· defense of academic freedom in the US Constitution appears to be of a more penumbral character, the
individual's rights definitely take precedence over those of the state in
questions of political loyalty and expression.
The Radical Ordinance and Keyishian suits have at least two items in com. man (buried ,n the fine print of the opinions). The first is the unwillingness
on the part of both the Constitutional and the Supreme Courts to accept membership in a "subversive" organization as a necessary and sufficient condition for
disqualification from professional public servic.e. The second point in common
is that both cases involve, but do not directly address, an institutional right
to the determination of university personnel.

It is rather obvious that uni-

versity hiring, firing and promotion rights are ultimately connected with the
protection and pursuit of research and teaching objectives, "since institutional
success in these areas depends substantially on the personal capacities of individual faculty members. 1157 Government regulations meant to induce academic
institutions to alter otherwise nondiscriminatory hiring practices infringe

24
upon the university's and its members• rights to freedom of association,
at
.
i
the same time. they interfere with scholarship.
F.

COMMON THEMES, UNCOMMON POTENTIAL FOR INFLUENCE
What tentative conclusions· can be drawn about judicial influen<i:e in the
.

.

i
1

field of higher education, with respect·to the Federal Republic and 1the United
i

States?

I-begin by pointing out that the operational definitions of scholar.

I

ship iterated by judges in Karlsruhe a.nd in Washington do not subst~ntially
I

differ~

The German
definition, which the BVerfG borrowed from Humboldt
in
.
i

its 1973 opinion, charges academics to consider Wissenschaft

11

as so~ething
I

sti 11 not coinpl etely found and to treat it as never completely to bJ discovered
I
1158
and yet persistently to be pursued.
The American v~rsion assert~ that
I

I

scholarship merits constitutional protection because. 11 no field of education·.
I
1

is so thoroughly comprehended by man (sic) that new discoveries canrtot yet be
made.~ 59
i
!

I
I

Academic freedom, a composite of indiv.idual and institutional +ghts,
I

becomes the core issue in all of the cases reviewed here.

.

Frankfurter outlined the

-

11

Supreme Court Justice

.

I

.

four essential freedoms of the university') in his conI

curring Sweezy opinion:

1

1) the right of the institution to set· its own .aca1

.

demi c standards. for faculty selection;
.

I

2) the right to determine what
will be
I
'

taught;

3) the right to determine how it will be taught; .4) the right to decide who may be adini tted to study. 60 In each of these four areas,· -ihe German
1

•

!

institutions of higher learning are subject to many more limitationi as a
1

direct result of judicial involvement
than is true for. the United States.
.
I

Yet

I

· in all of the cases discussed supra, there persists a tension betwe n the
.

.

1
I

rights of the individual, those of ·the institution and the interests; of the
state in matters educational.

In an effort to clarify which s·et of irights

. seem to prevail in each case, I have devised a classificatory scheme of sorts,
which I hope to develop at a later date:

I

I

I

• I
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Prevailing Set of Rights
Cons ti tu ti ona 1
Principles

INDIVIDUAL---) INSTITUTIONAL---) STATE RIGHTS
RIGHTS ·
( "COMPELLING INTEREST")
RIGHTS

Broadly
defined

Sweezy
Keyishian
Numerus Clausus
(1972, 1977)
(Group
·
University)

Narrowly
defined

Bakke

Radical Ordinance

Group
University

(Bakke)

Yeshiva

Individual rights find their basis of strength in the constitutional .9.QE!_ments themselves.

I would like. to suggest that they are therefore open to

broader interpretation.

Institutional rights are the product of tradition;

owing to a lack of documentary evidence as to their constitutional status, I
would expect the judiciary to be more cautious, viz. narrow, in the protection
.

.

.

.

:

.

it directly affords the universities. The power of the state is grounded in
-

its constitutionally mandated responsibility to protect its citizens• rights
and liberties; its powers are limited through enumeration, its powers expanqed
by the growing fiscal dependency of educational institutions.

I suspect that

the broad definition of state's rights depends on the possible consequences of
individually exercised freedoms.
For the present, I will simply note that the question of institutional
rights has ostensibly received the least amount of attention from the courts.
But to the extent that both the tenure processes and participation in university governance can be contrued as devices for protecting and promoting individual academic freedom, one cannot ign~re the institutional context in
which they operate.

Public institutions of higher learning may be compelled
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to stand up for their rights vis

a vis

the state legislatures as t~ey struggle
I

to secure their financial futures. To say that the superior courts ~ave not
I

-

I

acted on the matter of institutional rights in the past does not p1eclude them
.

from doing so a few years down the road.

i

In conclusion, what impa¢t has this
I

litigational foray into the field of higher education had on the jJdicial in1.

stitutions themselves?
G.

AUTHORITY GAINED, AUTONOMY LOST.

I
I

The courts have paid a heavy price for their involvement in the policymaking process.

-

i

Critics in the Federal Republic have· gone so far as to label

the judiciary in a disparaging fashion
-

.•

•

•

11 a

!

secret superministry of education. 1161
I

.

!

I

The judictary s attempt to forge a workable political consensus where none
1

_-

--

-

- -

'

-

-

-

••

•

,

-

-

-

I

'

I

exists is inextricably rooted in the status quo.
-

Laws build upon laws. To

- -

-

I

the extent that the courts cannot or will not excuse themselves inJresponse
to questions of political expediency, they ·are able to engrave th-e1r own higher
educational prescriptions on legislative tablets. The ,irony is thJt even if
I

. .

I

.

conflicting social groups are able to smash those tablets in a fitjof anger,
.

I
I

they are inevitably forced to return for a new set.

I

Wi,thin limits, the contribution of the German and American courts to the
-

I

policy process in their respective systems-is a function of thefr Jbility
to
I
go beyond the established i legal 11, criteria rooted in statute, precJdent and
1

I
I

constitution -- which is what usually _occurs when justices attempt to rule on
1

1

the -basis
of "legislative
-- - ·: - .
. -

11

-

-

.

intent. 11

.

.-

I

.

The tools
they employ may _be strictly
I
-

.-

-

-

I

1ega l II ones, but the setting of any case brought to the courts fol- the pur-

poses of relegating social conflict is undeniably ~politi~~l. 11 As Robert
1

Dahl argues,
.

II
f

/I/f the Court were assumed to be a 11 political 11 in-:
stitution, no particular problems would arise,, for ijt _
would be taken for granted"that members of the Court
-would resolve questions of fact and value by intro-]
ducing assumptions derived from their own predispo- i
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sitions or those of influential clientels and consituents. But since much of the legitimacy of the Court's
decisions rests upon the fiction that it is not a political institution but exclusively a legal one, to
accept the Court as a political institution would
solve one set of problems at the price of creating
another. 62
One problem does lead to another, as demonstrated by the effects of the
BVerfG Numerus clausus and "capacity" verdicts in particular. Moreover, the
tendency toward a more open "politicization of justice" in Germany, with its
parallels in the US, has caused a few cracks in the twin fac;ades of judicial
infallibility and unquestionable authority:
it is worth considering whether overindulgence in
appeals to the Bundesverfassungsqericht to make
fundamentally political decisions in favour of one
or the other policy is not bound to reduce respect
for it as a soufce of resolution of disputes which
is endowed with a higher rationality and authority
than the political actors possess. 63
Conflicting values (and personality differences) within the courts dispel the
notion that the judicious treatment of 11 law 11 will always provide a single,
authorit~tive, 11 right 11 answer; otherwise there would be little need for the
instrument of the dissenting opinion in Germany, and less need for an array of
concurring and dissenting opinions in the US in the wake of very close votes.
It is the purpose of law to promote a just social order within the framework of basic rights.

In other words, law has a dual function, that of pre-

serving order and that of protecting citizens against potential abuses of
state power.

It is dangerous to stress one at the expense of the other. 'This

duality also makes certain contradictions inevitable, since Western constitutions are markedly deficient in concrete criteria for establishirig at what
point individual well-being must defer to the common good, under what circumstances soci.al order takes precedence over civil liberty (at the crux of the
Berufsverbot issue)-~ not that we would want to expect them to be so explicit.
The advent of politicized legalism produces other tensions and snags in
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the fiber of societies whi.ch. characterize themselves as democratic!.

Many of

I

the changes thrust upon the higher educational systems, in _particuJ ar, stem
!

•

from a demand for greaterllsocial accountability and responsibility."

The

I

institutions of higher learning have been called upon to respect tte constitutiona·1 rights of individuals in determining who may or may nqt ent+r them.
!

Democratic systems have accepted the premise that education is a c1vn right,

I

whether it has beerf explicitly stated (Art. 12/1 GG) or implicitly contained
(First· and Fourteenth Amendments, USC) in their respective constit4tions. ·.
i

The courts are therefore cons ti tu ti anally ob] iged to prot~ct ~he rights
i

of individuals and minorities against the collectivity or the majoJity, and
!

.

. .

I

individual rights have often been· secured at the expense of qualit.}( education
.

and freedom for the whole.

.

. .

.·

I

It may be a plus for-·democratic system~ that citi-

zens have learned to make more effective use of the mechanisms of government
I

I

.available to them for the protection of their rights.

But it cert1inly com~

plicates .our understanding of conventional forms of participation i)n the policy1

I.

making.process.

I

.

I

.

Juridicalization is here to. stay, certainly in the Federal Rep ublic and
1

I

probably in the United States.

Despite the somewhat different thru'.sts of judi.

- cial involvement in educational policy (a

11

I

litigational 11 approach i'.ri the latter,
!

in contrast to a llconstitution.al" orientation i-n the former), the c~urts in
'

both countries have shown that
they do have an importantjpositive
rple to
'
,

\

I

play, in my judgment.· Given the highly complex ·nature of societal rnteractions,
.

I

the tasks of the judiciary now come to include the clarific_ation an~ specifi1

cation of the duties, rights and responsibilities that various elem~nts of the
.

I

academic task environment have with respect to each other and in re1ation to
i

society as a whole.

I hold this· development to be an acceptable onf only ,to

the extent that all societal institutions are guaranteed "equal protection

I

before·the law."

In light of my own political values, I am opposed;to the
.

I
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process of politicized legalism if it means that some institutions have only
duties (universities)., some have responsibilities (welfare agencies) and others
have only ipso facto rights (corporations).
I fear, however, that the disadvantages of juridicalization may far outweigh the advantages in dealing with political - constitutional conflicts. The
contradiction between society 1 s need to respond flexibly to constantly changing
socio-economic conditions and the generally irreversible nature of judicial
pronouncements. is an 11 antagonistic 11 one. The carved-in-stone character of
Constitutional Court verdicts, especially, assuages the uncertainties of decision-makers engaged in one social conflict, at the same time it generates new
ones.

Even if US Supreme Court justices do not exhibit quite the same pre-

dilection for irreversible decisions-as their German counterparts, they are
far from enthusiastic about overturning prior rulings should the opportunity
arise.

Policy-makers, on the other hand, may not be entirely satisfied with

the resu1ts of litigation, yet they are nonetheless glad to be relieved -of
many a difficult political decision in this manner. A bad compromise is often
better than no compromise at all for politicians and administrators whose attentions must quickly be diverted to other pressing social problems.
While legal judgments ensure conflicting ·parties· a degree of consensus
(contrived though it may be) in the short run, they impair the universities•
ability to manage their own interdependencies more creatively in the fong run.
Each court ruling presents university administrators, legislators and bureaucrats with a clear outline of constraints, but blocks off categories of alternatives which might be utilized later on to handle institutional contingencies.
Justices are by definition legal experts. Their lick of substantive expertise
promises to become a serious impediment in developing their capacity for proposing remedies that are as educationally effective as they are legally rational. 64 ·The~ filS judicia, upon whose counsel· citizens•· and institutions

1
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fu_tures no\a_/ more heavily depend, occasJonally bears a rather suspilious family
rese111blance to the Wizard of Oz.

i

Naturally some supreme courts are more likely to speak~ cath edra regard1

!

· ing educational matters than are. others.

I am- arguing that the jur idicaliza1

tion of academic reform issues is a functio·n of a lack of political! consensus,
!
, and that educational systems in other Weste_rn nations may be able tp rely on
I

alternative vehicles for conflict resolution.

The approaches basedi.on constii

tutional rights in the United States and the Federal Republic are t~e product
of very diverse leg~l traditions; the .tendency of the
courts-to
invblve
them.
.
I
selves

in

I

specific. educational conflicts at all levels of schoolingi evinces a
I

growing number of parallels.nonetheless. (Lately the judicial branches in- the
.

I

US and the FRG have fielded questions. of sex education and- have ever seen fit
I

to define the concept of a 11 disab.led learner,'' entitling children tp- participate in state compensatory programs).

The juridicalization of univrrsity re,

form in the Gennan Federal Republic may be special insofar as it is\ among the
first system to have been so thoroughly infused with formal legaL values.
'

will certainly not be the last.

!

It

I

I

Jesse Choper has set forth four proposals delegating and delim~ting: the
~uri sdi ctiona l powers of the US Supreme Court, which in effect would[ 1ead to
I
.
63
greater specialization in constitutional matters along German 1ines~_
He
I
I

emphasizes . that

I

the federal judiciary's ability to persuade the.
populac~ and public leader~·that it is.right and
they are wrong is determined by-the number and
frequency of its attempts to do so, the felt importance of the policies it disapproves, and the
perceived substantive correctness of its deci. sions. 65
I
I
I

Theodore Lowi•pursues a similar argument, maintaining that "juridical
I

· democracy" should be used to reimpose the basic "separation of powers"
I

31

doctrine by putting a halt to the delegation of discretionary powers from the
legislature to the administrative agencies of the Positive State. 66
I agree with the basic prognosis that the persuasive powers of the judicial branch are finite and that the justices must be very careful not to exhaust their 11 capital II which derives from the 11 po1 itica11y neutral II character
of their pronouncements in earlier times. I am much less optimistic, however,
about the judiciary's prospects for.extracting itself from the complex web
of intergovernmental relations which it has helped to spin, and which in turn ·
precludes its ability to reestablish the separation of powers among legislative,
political and administrative actors.

It is indeed the responsibility of the

federa'l judiciary to monitor the perfonnance of the other branches. As the
.

.

. .

scope of state activity expands, the courts witness an increase in the number
and range of social institutions which fall under their purview, including
universities. Along with David Horowitz, I can offer a caveat, but no way out
of the juridicalization dilemma:
Over the long run, augmenting judicial capacity
may erode the distinctive contribution the courts
, make to the social order. The danger ·;s- that
courts. i"n developing a capacity- to improve- on the
work of other- i nsti tuti ons, may become a1together
too much like them. 67
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